F-35 and Risk Management

F-35A Assembly at Lockheed Ft. Worth

It has been no secret that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the air-superiority aircraft intended replace numerous legacy counterparts, has had its fair share of difficulties. Acquisition costs have ballooned to $400bn and another $1tn (yes, trillion) in operating and support costs are expected. The Air Force even had to repaint their refueling trucks from green to white because the former color absorbed too much heat and the resulting fuel temperature was inoperable with the F-35B short-take off, vertical landing (STOVL) variant. A fascinating article from David Axe sheds light on what we are really buying through one of the government’s largest and most important programs. An unnamed test pilot wrote a scathing unclassified briefing after a dogfight test with an F-16D.

"The stealth fighter proved too sluggish to reliably defeat the F-16, even with the F-16 lugging extra fuel tanks. ‘Even with the limited F-16 target configuration, the F-35A remained at a distinct energy disadvantage for every engagement,’ the pilot reported.

‘Insufficient pitch rate.’ ‘Energy deficit to the bandit would increase over time.’ ‘The flying qualities in the blended region (20–26 degrees AoA) were not intuitive or favorable.’

The F-35 jockey tried to target the F-16 with the stealth jet’s 25-millimeter cannon, but the smaller F-16 easily dodged. ‘Instead of catching the bandit off-guard by rapidly pull aft to achieve lead, the nose rate was slow, allowing him to easily time his jink prior to a gun solution,’ the JSF pilot complained.

And when the pilot of the F-16 turned the tables on the F-35, maneuvering to put the stealth plane in his own gunsight, the JSF jockey found he couldn’t maneuver out of the way, owing to a ‘lack of nose rate.’

The F-35 pilot came right out and said it — if you’re flying a JSF, there’s no point in trying to get into a sustained, close turning battle with another fighter. ‘There were not compelling reasons to fight in this region.’ God help you if the enemy surprises you and you have no choice but to turn.

[….]In the end, the F-35 — the only new fighter jet that America and most of its allies are developing — is demonstrably inferior in a dogfight with the F-16, which the U.S. Air Force first acquired in the late 1970s.”

This process of testing  your system against handicapped opponents or unrealistic situations is rife. The Ballistics Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) would put a infrared beacon or radar reflector on the target missile in order to make the test intercept easier.

As Axe explained in another article, the F-35’s design was compromised to fulfill the needs of the Marine Corps who insisted on the STOVL. In order to get the lift-fan mechanism to work, it was decided to dump 11 pounds of worth of valves and fuses making the plane 25% more likely to get destroyed by enemy fire. The Chinese, who likely hacked and stole engineering data from Lockheed, have quickly built an F-35 replica without the complexity stemming from the STOVL requirements.

Here is my take on the subject, which comes down to risk management. Even if there is a slight chance of total ruin, the precautionary principle applies. Climate change is an often used case of this logic. Even if the chances that humans are causing climate change are miniscule, the potential effects are so great that the burden of proof must be on those who wish to do nothing. Nissim Talebhas applied the precautionary principle to GMOs because an unintended blight could destroy the entire ecosystem.

The precautionary principle can be applied in defense acquisitions as well. The F-35 has monopoly in its sphere and we are led to believe that there is at least a reasonable chance that it will be completely outclassed by competitors. If air superiority turns out to be a decisive factor in the next war, I would argue that diversification is a sound choice. 

Interestingly enough, enacting the precautionary principle usually comes at a cost of "higher returns" (e.g. emissions regulations dampen economic growth), but the case here is that we are paying more for accepting this risk because of the nature of massive acquisition programs (more on this discussed later). 

The strengths of the F-16 were born in a reaction to the complexities of the F-15, and has proved itself simple, effective, and enduring. The F-35 is also intended to replace the A-10, whose strengths come from features that stand in stark contrast to the F-16. 

I don’t see an easy resolution to the F-35 problem. The primary impediment to change is how insular the program is from the public eye (aided and abetted by poor media coverage).